A ideia de filosofia como ciência originária: o problema da atitude teórica segundo Heidegger

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the first step of the hermeneutic turn in Heidegger´s phenomenology. To do so, Heidegger analyzes the critical-teleological methods of the neo-Kantian school of Baden, the reconstructive of Paul Natorp, and the reflexive descriptive of Husserl's phenomenology. All three currents have great relevance for the author, since their methodologies tend to conceive a single principle from which everything is subsequently derived. Heidegger's criticisms point to the theoretical attitude that is naively presupposed by these three philosophical currents. On the other hand, he argues that, through the radical adoption of the Husserlian phenomenological principle, we can achieve an adequate method for the opening of the sphere of a philosophy as a primordial and pre-theoretical science. The project of primordial science extends for almost a decade and culminates in Being and Time