A presunção de inocência no tribunal penal internacional

Abstract

The aim of this work herein is to demonstrate that the principle of the presumption of innocence, whose crystallization has taken two centuries to be completed, has been shaken by the Statute of the International Criminal Court, a human rights international covenant, upon establishing the possibility of the decreeing of the preventive custody against the acquitted. Thereby the effects of the acquittal are suspended pending confirmation of the decision by the Higher Court of Appeals. A warning is hereby conveyed that this unjust arrest, devoid of any injunctive relief nature in the face of its lack of instrumentality, as at this stage in the procedural sequence a final decision has already been reached, which is adopted by the same international community that has always been so worried in limiting the intervention of the State in the sphere of the freedom of the individuals, may have repercussion in the laws of the signatory States, which might be encouraged to promote undesirable reforms of their criminal procedural laws, reestablishing detention measures that put the accused on the same level with the convicted, a practice that has been abolished for many years by civilized countries, under the argument or false argument that the domestic legislation has to be adapted to suit the international one.