Aspectos da doutrina aristotélica no conceito de mente de G. Ryle

Abstract

This work has as scope to analyze aspects of the Aristotelian doctrine that are present in G. Ryle's concept of mind. Ryle's thesis on mental entities, expressed in his famous work “The concept of mind”, can be divided into two central parts: the refutation of official doctrine; a theory about nature and the place of mind; and its dispositional concept of mind, in which he states that the words and terms used to indicate certain mental conduct cannot be words and terms denoting states or episodes. In order to highlight the Aristotelian aspects of Ryle's concept of mind, the thesis is exposed in three main arguments. At first, the argument is a historical resource, because it was through facts and events which is evidenced that Ryle not only participated actively in the movement to resume Aristotelian studies at Oxford University but was also acted effectively in study groups and in the publication of works strongly marked by Aristotle’s influence. The second argument aims to analyze that Ryle's use of the concept of categorical mistake as well as his argument from the reductio ad absurdum in The concept of mind, present unmistakable evidence of the logical concepts contained in Aristotle's treatises. This is evident in the analysis of his concept of categorial mistake, the presentation of the facts of the mental life as belonging to a type or category, when, in fact, these deeds belong to another category, since the practical use made of it is evidently based on the categorical Aristotle’s concept. The consequence of this categorial mistake is the presentation of the ghost dogma in the machine, described as a myth. The last argument in support of the presence of Aristotelian aspects in Ryle's concept of mind is to point out that the dispositional concept of mind, described by Ryle, carries the sign of Aristotle's presence, since the way in which Ryle conceives his dispositional concept of mind is very similar to the way in which Aristotle conceives the concept of psyche described in his work De Anima. To do so, the work starts from the interpretation that the Aristotelian notion of psychê, as "enteléquia", "act first" in De Anima, II, 1, indicates that the psychê is present as a disposition. Aristotle speaks about the presence of the psyche as a disposition, for precisely this allows him to postulate that it is present in the sperm, in relation to animals, and in the fruits of plants. Thus, from the understanding of the Aristotelian doctrine of the psychê, Ryle sought to ground his dispositional concept by demonstrating that the mind is not a hidden entity that moves the body or thinks and plans what the body will, in a second moment, do. Therefore, it is not a question of asserting that Ryle was Aristotelian, but rather that the arguments used in support of his thesis on metal entities have deeper roots than those described in his famous work The concept of mind, they are anchored in the strong foundations of Aristotle's philosophy