Karl Popper e a teoria da explicação nas Ciências Sociais

Abstract

Our investigation is about the methodological proposal has suggested by the philosopher Karl Popper to social science studies. We focusing specifically the contents of the articles The Logic of Social Science, based on his conference held by German Sociological Association in Tübingen in 1961, and Models, Instruments and Truth, a slightly revised version of his speech delivered at Harvard Economic Department in 1963. Our appraisal identifies as major objective of these articles the Popper´s defense in favor of the explanation theory guidance for conducting the academic works at the moment when the descriptive approach, in its different perspectives, has started to be a major orientation for the social science academic production. We begin exposing the traditional subjects that forms the popperian epistemology, in this case, regarding to the social philosophy. Following, we discuss the relation between the popperian epistemology and the more comprehensive and wide-ranging epistemic thinking of the analytical theorization. We emphasize the start point for all Popper`s evaluation about the social science and its methodology is “the” problem for social theory. He has identified this characteristic problem as a “contradiction”, however, we argue in favor of the logical format explained by Popper is more precise recognized as a “counterfinality” in the social action, i.e., the social repercussion not intentional and mostly of time unwelcome results of human activity. In conclusion, because of the many important conceptual elements that Popper enhanced to the debate about the varieties of social explanation, we postulate and present arguments in support of the idea that he had a pioneering view of the question in the sense to be precursor about the theoretical approach designated “mechanism-based explanation” that would become several years later a new front and step ahead in the explanation concept